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Abstract—Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE)
protocols allow parties to share secret keys in an authentic
manner based on an easily memorizable password. Recently,
Nam et al. showed that a provably secure three-party password-
based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing
by Wen et al. is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. In
doing so, Nam et al. showed the flaws in the proof of Wen et al.
and described how to fix the problem so that their attack no
longer works. In this paper, we show that both Wen et al. and
Nam et al. variants fall to key compromise impersonation by
any adversary. Our results underline the fact that although the
provable security approach is necessary to designing PAKEs,
gaps still exist between what can be proven and what are really
secure in practice.
Keywords-Password-authenticated key exchange; cryptanal-
ysis; attacks; provable security; three-party; key compromise
impersonation; Weil pairing
I. INTRODUCTION
A 2-party password-based authenticated key exchange
(PAKE) protocol [5] allows two parties to authenticate each
other and to establish a common session key for securing a
communication session using a low-entropy password. The
first known PAKE is due to Bellovin and Merritt [6]. This
concept has also been extended to 3 parties, e.g. two clients
and a trusted server or key distribution center (KDC) [1],
[2], [3], [10], [14], [17], [18], [19], [20], [35], [36], [22].
Recently, Wen et al. proposed a three-party password-
based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pair-
ing [37]. The protocol was formally proven secure in the
random oracle model [4], [5]. Nam et al. [25] however
showed that the security proof in [37] is flawed and pointed
out that the protocol is vulnerable to unknown key-share
attack (UKS) [16], [13], i.e. a client A (resp. B) thinking it
is sharing a key with B (resp. A) when it is actually sharing
with a malicious adversary C. Nam et al. proposed a way
to prevent their attack, basically by including the identities
of both clients into the generation of the secret session key
shared by each client with the server.
The basic requirements of PAKEs can be found in litera-
ture, e.g. [24], [9]. In particular, they are as follows.
• Dictionary attack resilience: Originally, a dictionary
attack is a password guessing technique in which the
adversary attempts to determine a user’s password by
successively trying words from a dictionary (a compiled
list of likely passwords) in the hope that one of these
password guesses will be the user’s actual password.
This attack can be performed in online mode (trying
successive passwords until a login is successful) or off-
line mode (hashing or encrypting a dictionary of words
and looking for any matches in a copied system file
of hashed or encrypted user passwords). Informally,
in the scenario of PAKE protocols, we say that a
protocol is secure against off-line dictionary attacks if
an adversary who obtains all the communication data
between the client and the server is unable to carry out
the dictionary attack to obtain the client’s password.
This can be achieved if and only if there is no verifiable
ciphertext based on a human-memorizable password in
the protocol run.
• Unknown key-share attack (UKS) resilience: UKS is
an attack where a party A believes that he shares a key
with another party B upon completion of a protocol
run (this is in fact the case), but B falsely believes that
the key is instead shared with a party E = A. A basic
PAKE protocol should be resilient to this.
• Perfect forward secrecy (PFS): If long-term private
keys or secrets of any party is compromised, the secrecy
of previously established session keys should not be
affected. This is an attempt to still offer some form of
security guarantee in spite of the fact that the long-term
secret has been leaked.
• Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience:
The compromise of any party’s (client or server) long-
term key or secret should not enable the adversary to
impersonate any other parties.
It is important for a security protocol, as is a PAKE pro-
tocol, to be secure not only against known types of attacks
[14], [13], [15], [16], [28], [29], [30], [33], [34] including
those listed above, but also be designed to resist any kind of
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attack by an adversary of some defined adversarial power.
Indeed, provably secure protocols take the latter approach
and provide a reasonable measure of security in the protocol
design. Nevertheless, the fact that a protocol is provably
secure does not preclude [11], [12], [26], [27], [31], [32]
weaknesses or flaws in proofs due to oversights or subtleties
in security model definitions. Thus, it is vital that even
provably secure protocols are carefully analyzed to ensure
they do not miss capturing resistance against any kinds of
attacks.
In this paper, we contribute to this direction by showing
that both the Nam et al. variant and provably secure Wen et
al. variant are susceptible to key compromise impersonation
(KCI) attacks [15], [9].
II. NAM ET AL. AND WEN ET AL. PROTOCOLS
We will use the notations given in Table I. Unless other-
wise mentioned, all described operations are done modulo
p, except operations in the exponents, and all protocols are
based on Diffie-Hellman (DH) type assumptions.
Table I
NOTATIONS
A,B The clients
IDi The identity of party i
S The server who stores the identity (IDi) and password
(pwi) of client i
s Long-term private key of S
PS Equals sP ; this is the public key of S
pwi Client i’s human-memorizable password shared with S
Ek(·) Symmetric encryption using the secret key, k
Dk(·) Symmetric decryption using the secret key, k
p Sufficiently large prime
H Cryptographic hash function
G Hash function {0, 1}∗ → G1
x ∈R Z∗p Randomly choosing an element x of Z∗p
Throughout this paper, (G1,+) and (G2, ·) denote two
cyclic groups of prime order q. A bilinear map [23], eˆ :
G1 ×G1 → G2 satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all P , Q ∈ G1 and all a, b ∈ Z,
eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: There exists a P ∈ G1 such that
eˆ(P, P ) = 1.
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to com-
pute eˆ(P,Q) for any P , Q ∈ G1.
Since the Nam et al. protocol is an improvement of the Wen
et al. one, for the rest of this paper our descriptions are based
on Nam et al. though all results equally to the Wen et al.
variant.
The security of the Nam et al. protocol is based on Weil
Diffie-Hellman (WDH) assumption [7], [8]. This assumption
states that given groups G1, G2 ,a pairing eˆ : G1 × G1 →
G2, and aP, bP, cP ∈ G1 for random a, b, c ∈ Zp, it is
computationally intractable to compute eˆ(P, P )abc ∈ G2.
Basically, the protocol involves the following five steps
(see Fig. 1):
1) A selects a random number a ∈R Z∗p and computes
aP , Q = G(IDS), and ka = H(IDA, IDB , aP, PS ,
Q, eˆ(PS , aQ)). Then, A computes ca = Eka(PWA)
and sends 〈IDA, aP, ca〉 to B.
2) B selects a random number b ∈R Z∗p and computes
bP , Q = G(IDS), kb = H(IDB , IDA, bP, PS , Q,
eˆ(PS , bQ)), R = G(IDA, IDB), and K = eˆ(aP, bR).
Then, B computes cb = Ekb(PWB) and μb =
H(IDB , K). B sends 〈IDA, aP, ca, IDB , bP, cb, μb〉
to S.
3) Based on IDA, IDB from the received message,
the server S can retrieve the passwords PWA,
PWB from the database. S first computes ka =
H(IDA, IDB , aP, PS , Q, eˆ(aP, sQ)) and kb =
H(IDB , IDA, bP, PS , Q, eˆ(PS , bQ)). Then, S checks
if PWA = Dka(ca) and PWB = Dkb(cb) respec-
tively. If not, S stops executing the protocol. Oth-
erwise, S, computes σa = H(kb, aP ) and σb =
H(ka, bP ), and sends 〈bP, μb, σb, σa〉 to A.
4) A first computes R = G(IDA, IDB) and K =
eˆ(bP, aR). Then, A computes and checks if σb and
μb equal to H(ka, bP ) and H(IDB ,K) respectively.
If not, A stops executing the protocol. Otherwise,
A computes μa = H(IDA,K) and the session key
SK = H(aP, bP,R,K). Finally, A sends 〈μa, σa〉 to
B.
5) B checks if σa = H(kb, aP ) and μa = H(IDA,K).
If not, it terminates the protocol. Otherwise, B com-
putes the session key SK = H(aP, bP,R,K).
With this description, then the Wen et al. protocol is simi-
lar except in step (1) where A computes ka = H(aP, PS , Q,
eˆ(PS , aQ)); step (2) where B computes kb = H(bP, PS , Q,
eˆ(PS , bQ)); step (3) where S computes ka = H(aP, PS , Q,
eˆ(aP, sQ)) and kb = H(bP, PS , Q, eˆ(PS , bQ)).
III. ON THE SECURITY OF BOTH PROTOCOLS
Recall the definition of key compromise impersonation
(KCI) resilience. In more detail, when an adversary learns
the long-term key s of the server S, obviously then the server
can be impersonated trivially. Resilience against KCI attacks
is formulated so that some sort of security guarantee can
still be afforded even when this long-term key is leaked.
In particular, though it is clear that the server can be
impersonated, yet KCI resilience offers the guarantee that
this is the most an adversary could do, and that the adversary
cannot impersonate anyone else to S.
We show a key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack
on both Nam et al. and Wen et al. protocols that can be
mounted by any adversary. In particular, when an adversary
learns the long-term key s of the server S, the adversary
can impersonate anyone else to S, thus contradicting the
KCI resilience requirement. It works as follows:
1) The message 〈IDA, aP, ca〉 from A to B, and simi-
larly the message 〈IDB , bP, cb, μb〉 from B to S are
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A B S
a ∈R Z∗p
Q = G(IDS)
ka = H(IDA, IDB, aP, PS, Q, eˆ(PS, aQ))
ca = Eka (PWA)
IDA,aP,ca−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
b ∈R Z∗p
Q = G(IDS)
kb = H(IDB, IDA, bP, PS, Q, eˆ(PS, bQ))
cb = Ekb (PWB)
R = G(IDA, IDB)
K = eˆ(aP, bR)
μb = H(IDB, K)
IDA,aP,ca,IDB ,bP,cb,μb−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ka = H(IDA, IDB, aP, PS, Q, eˆ(aP, sQ))
kb = H(IDB, IDA, bP, PS, Q, eˆ(bP, sQ))
PWA
?
= Dka (ca)
PWB
?
= Dkb (cb)
σa = H(kb, aP )
σb = H(ka, bP )
bP,μb,σb,σa←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
R = G(IDA, IDB)
K = eˆ(bP, aR)
σb
?
= H(ka, bP )
μb
?
= H(IDB, K)
μa = H(IDA, K)
SK = H(aP, bP, R, K)
μa,σa−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
σa
?
= H(kb, aP )
μa
?
= H(IDA, K)
SK = H(aP, bP, R, K)
Figure 1. Nam et al. Protocol
easily attainable by a passive eavesdropping adversary
C.
2) Upon compromising the long-term key s of the
server S, the adversary C is thus able to
compute ka = H(IDA, IDB , aP, Ps,Q, eˆ(PS , aQ))
and kb = H(IDB , IDA, bP, Ps,Q, eˆ(PS , bQ))
(ka = H(aP, Ps,Q, eˆ(PS , aQ)) and kb =
H(bP, Ps,Q, eˆ(PS , bQ)) for Wen et al. protocol.),
since the only secret input to the computation of ka
and kb is s.
3) Decrypt ca and cb with ka and kb respectively. Thus,
C can obtain PWA and PWB .
4) C can now impersonate A (resp. B) to S because
authentication of A (resp. B) to S just depends on
PWA (resp. PWB).
IV. CONCLUSION
Wen et al. proposed three-party password-based authenti-
cated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing [37], with
security proof in the random oracle model. Nam et al. [25]
showed the insecurity of the Wen et al. protocol, and pro-
posed an improvement to counter their attack. Nevertheless,
we have demonstrated that the Nam et al. improvement and
the original Wen et al. protocol, both do not provide re-
silience to key-compromise impersonation (KCI) [9] which
is nowadays commonly expected of key exchange protocols.
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The problem with both protocols lies in that the client
password is encapsulated with a function where the only
unknown secret input is the long-term private key of the
server. KCI attacks can be prevented for instance by having
the password encapsulation (in this case ca or cb) be a
function of not only the long-term private key of the server
but also a function of some ephemeral (short-term) unknown
variables that are never sent in the clear to another party but
instead only used locally within the context of a protocol
run.
Nevertheless, we caution against adhocly fixing a protocol
without a thorough re-analysis in the provable security
model, thus both protocols should not be used in practical
applications. Instead, we suggest to use the three-party
PAKEs rigorously proven secure in the formal sense, e.g.
[1], [3].
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